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Background: User fees, transportation costs, and time costs impair access to healthcare by rural communities in
low and middle income countries. However, effects of time costs on demand for healthcare are less understood
than effects of user fees for health providers. In addition, prospective patients might not know about all health
services available. This study aims to investigate how the family caregivers of febrile children respond to the
pecuniary costs and time costs in their choice of health providers in rural Papua New Guinea.
Methods: Using an original questionnaire, we surveyed households in the catchment area surrounding Dagua
Health Center in East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea, during February–March 2015. We estimated the
probability of choosing one among four categories of providers (i.e., the health center, aid posts, village health
volunteers [VHVs], or home-treatment) via a mixed logit model in which we restrict alternatives to those for which
family caregivers knew cost information.
Results: Of 1173 family caregivers, 96% sought treatment for febrile children from four categories of providers.
Almost all knew the location of the health center and a health volunteer, but only 50% knew the location of aid
posts. Analysis by discrete choice model showed that pecuniary costs and time costs were inversely associated with
the probability of choosing any type of provider. We then changed pecuniary costs and time costs counterfactually
to calculate and compare the probability of choosing each provider. Time costs affected the choice more than
pecuniary costs, and individual heterogeneity appeared among caregivers with respect to pecuniary costs. When
pecuniary or time costs of VHVs are altered, substitution between VHVs and home-treatment appeared.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that policies to increase awareness of aid posts and reduce time costs in
addition to treatment fees for each category of healthcare provider could help developing economies to improve
access to essential healthcare services.
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Access to essential healthcare services is an important
public health issue in low and middle income countries
(LMIC). Though health policy causing change of supply
curve (e.g., increasing quality and quantity of health staff
and medial materials) has been promoted, the importance
of intervention overcoming demand side barriers was also
emphasized to improve healthcare service utilization [1].
Among demand side barriers, the previous economic
studies has intensively argued the effect of user fees on
healthcare access in LMIC [2–8]. Although quality of the
evidence is poor, a review on intervention studies suggests
that user fees have a negative effect on the use of medical
services [9].
On the other hand, Acton [10] pointed out that non-
monetary costs can be an important factor affecting the
use of health services. In LMIC, Heller [2] initially ana-
lyzed health provider choice including non-monetary
costs such as travel times and waiting times using the
discrete choice model. In several pioneer works in
LMIC, non-monetary costs as well as pecuniary costs
were included into discrete choice models [2–5, 8, 11].
However, these studies mainly focused on the effect of
user fee on healthcare service utilization in the context
of the structural adjustment programs, and in most stud-
ies, amounts of non-monetary costs were relatively small
because the target population lived in urban areas.
The population living in rural parts of LMIC countries,
however, confront long distances, undependable trans-
portation, and steep travel costs to access healthcare.
Numerous studies examine how distance traveled affects
choice of healthcare providers there [12–16]. In rural
parts of LMIC, however, time costs of visiting providers
can be quite large and hence should not be ignored. The
studies that have left out travel time may have overstated
the importance of distance or travel costs on provider
choice. More distant patients may visit the provider less
often, not only because it costs more for them to visit,
but also because it takes much longer for them to visit.
Yet, in rural parts of LMIC, little is known about the ef-
fect of time cost on healthcare provider choice except in
a few reports in maternal and child health field [17, 18].
Moreover, once we know more about the effects of time
costs there, we may be able to find policies that can re-
duce time costs, and we may be able compare them with
the policies that reduce monetary costs of patients.
In Papua New Guinea (PNG), as the mortality rate for
children under 5 years old is the third worst among 23
developing East Asia and Pacific Region economies [19],
policies to control the disease and acute infections in
children has been given a high priority in public health;
improvement in child mortality is a goal of PNG’s na-
tional health plan [20]. Therefore, we analyze which type
of healthcare provider the residents in rural PNG chooseto take their children with fevers, a symptom of acute in-
fection for treatment. Although fees for formal health-
care services are fixed for an episode and relatively
inexpensive, residents face differential costs for travel,
time, and treatment options [16]. Price-substitutability
among alternatives is easily estimated, allowing us to
compare how pecuniary and time costs affect the prob-
ability of choosing each type of provider.
This study examines how the family caregivers of febrile
children respond to the pecuniary costs and time costs in
their choice of health providers. We used discrete choice
models to estimate the probability of an alternative being
chosen. We calculated own- and cross-cost responsiveness
to predicted choice probability for each provider by coun-
terfactual analysis and examined substitutability between
alternatives. We also performed a sub-group analysis for
severity of minor patients’ symptoms.Methods
Study setting
The study covered 23 villages in the catchment area sur-
rounding the Dagua Health Center, located 56 km west
of Wewak, the capital of East Sepik Province of PNG. In
the lowland swamp along the main coastal road malaria
is endemic year-round. The Dagua Health Center is op-
erated 24 h a day by the Catholic Church. Eleven health
professionals provide medical/public health services, in-
cluding ambulatory care, hospitalization for general in-
ternal medicine (tuberculosis, antenatal and normal
delivery care), and outreach services (immunization and
emergency care). It treated an average of 20.1 outpa-
tients per day in 2016, a figure not considered to consti-
tute excessive demand [21].
With only one health professional assigned, each aid
post provides general outpatient care and normal deliv-
ery services. Its staff is nationally certified by completing
a two-year program at a medical college or a university
and is allowed to perform the same clinical works as
nurses. Our surveyed population had access to four such
aid posts. Although records on the number of their pa-
tients were unavailable, we observed that two or fewer
patients awaited treatment at any given time, suggesting
the demand for their services was not excessive. While
the traditional practitioners of herbal or spiritual remed-
ies were commonplace, the area had only one distributor
of Western pharmaceuticals. The provincial capital city
of Wewak, has only one general hospital and two public
clinics. The hospital provides general medicine, surgery,
pediatric, obstetric, psychiatric, and physical therapy in
emergency outpatient and inpatient departments besides
overseeing provincial public health. Staffed by five or so
professionals, public clinics provide general outpatient
and normal delivery services.
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capitation payments, covering consultation, clinical exams,
laboratory tests, medications, and follow-up visits. The
fees vary from one facility to another, but the costs are less
than the nation’s minimum hourly wage. Public transpor-
tation, in the form of buses or public motor vehicles
(PMVs), are available to villagers beyond walking distance.
PMVs operate daily, except on Sundays, from villages to
Wewak, once in the morning, and from Wewak to vil-
lages, once in the afternoon. The government regulates
transportation charges on the basis of distance traveled.
Neither public nor community-based health insurance
had been introduced in the area studied.
To improve access to basic healthcare, lay workers
called “village health volunteers” (VHVs) have served in
area studied since 2007 [16]. The VHVs treat patients
with acute infectious diseases such as malaria, pneumo-
nia, and diarrhea without charge, but, with approval
from local authorities, they may charge a small flat rate
(less than fees of formal health facilities). During the
period studied, a VHV treated an average of 0.81 pa-
tients per day, the one with the smallest load treating
0.25 patients per day and the one with the highest load
treating 1.71 patients per day. We never observed VHVs
refusing a consultation or curtailing services due to ex-
cessive patient load. Excess demand is unlikely.
Study design and data collection
During February–March 2015 using an original ques-
tionnaire, we conducted a cross-sectional survey of
households in which parents or parent surrogates were
taking care of children under age 15. Trained field inter-
viewers collected data about episodes of fever among
their children and the respondent’s choices of health
providers during the 2 weeks preceding the interview.
The lead researcher double-checked questionnaires
completed by field interviewers. Missing and erroneous
values were corrected by revisiting respondents.
Questions asked about instances of fever, home-
treatment at its onset, initial choices of health provider,
the second, and the third or subsequent choices of health
provider. The survey also asked the caregivers to give in-
formation on all health providers where they may take
their children when they are sick: namely, [1] location, [2]
name, [3] out-of-pocket payment, [4] wait/treatment time,
[5] time spent from house to the provider when they
travel only on foot, [6] respondent’s payment for a round-
trip to the provider when they use public transportation,
and [7] clock time of leaving home and clock time of
returning home when they use public transportation. It
also asked respondents about the characteristics and the
conditions of the minor patients (gender, age, severity of
illness as perceived by respondents), years of schooling of
the caregivers, number of individuals in the household,holdings of western drugs for fever treatment (e. g., acet-
aminophen, amoxicillin, antimalarial drugs), information
on household assets (ownership of mobile phones, radios,
generators, cars or outboard motorboats, tin roofs, and
brick, metal, or concrete walls), and information on the
access to safe drinking water.
We define the pecuniary costs as “caregiver’s out-of-
pocket payments for a health provider plus round-trip
transportation fees to get there”. We use survey respon-
dents’ self-reported estimate of pecuniary costs for each
healthcare provider respondents had named, including
the ones they had not chosen. As we described above,
out-of-pocket payment for a health provider was equal
to a fixed sum covering consultation, clinical exams, la-
boratory tests, treatments, drugs, and follow-up visits for
VHVs, the aid posts, or the health center.
Time cost is defined as “the caregiver’s opportunity
cost for his/her self-reported time spent in seeking
and obtaining healthcare away from home or work”.
To calculate time costs, first we calculate time re-
quired for care at each health provider for each care-
giver. When caregivers would travel to a health
provider only on foot, total time required for its care
was calculated as round-trip walking time plus its
wait/treatment time. When caregivers would use pub-
lic transportation to a health provider, total time re-
quired for its care was calculated as time difference
between clock time of returning home and clock time
of leaving home. We then calculate the individual
time costs by multiplying the time required for care
at each health provider by the caregiver’s wage rate.
To check the self-reported travel time, we calcu-
lated individual travel distances for each provider. We
first recorded the locations of each house and each
health provider with global positioning system (GPS)
devices (Foretrex 401, Garmin Ltd). We then mea-
sured individual distances, using a digital map of the
area (PASCO Satellite Ortho, PASCO Corporation)
and Quantum GIS 2.14, as [1] the walking distance
for a round trip from home to the provider, if the
caregiver who would travel on foot, and as [2] the
sum of walking distance from house to road, the pub-
lic transportation distance (i.e., actual road distance),
and walking distance from road to the provider, if the
caregiver would travel on foot and by public
transportation.
Statistical analysis
We calculated the probability for a caregiver to
choose a particular type of healthcare provider using
a discrete choice model in which the individual tries
to maximize utility by their choice. However, our re-
spondents were not necessarily aware of all the pro-
viders available in the area. Providers they were
Table 1 Awareness of health provider’s location
Health service N Awareness
Health center 1167 0.983
VHV 1168 0.979
Clinic 1165 0.658
Traditional health practitioner 1167 0.559
Aid post 1162 0.540
Western medicine seller 1156 0.143
Percentages of the survey’s 1173 respondents who are aware of healthcare
providers’ locations are shown in the far right column
VHV village health volunteer
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eligible alternatives. Also, conceivably, respondents
would not choose providers they believe offer low
utility even if they were aware of them. For these rea-
sons, we postulated that to be an eligible alternative,
[1] a health provider had to be known to the re-
spondent, and [2] the probability of choosing it had
to be at least 2% in our pooled data. We calculated
pecuniary and time costs only for the alternatives
meeting those two criteria.
The model’s explained variable was “a healthcare pro-
vider chosen for a febrile child in the two weeks before
the interview date.” We defined home-treatment as all
the treatment given within a household at any time dur-
ing one fever episode without incurring any pecuniary
costs. Home-treatment, for instance, included monitor-
ing the sick child without treatment in a family. Follow-
ing the previous studies, time costs of home-treatment
were normalized to zero [4, 8].
When a caregiver did not have cost information of
the health center, any aid post, or any VHV, we ex-
cluded those alternatives from his/her choice set. We
assumed all caregivers could have chosen home-
treatment. Therefore, the number of alternatives in a
choice set varied for each caregiver between two to
four, and its average was 3.4. A small number of re-
spondents visited multiple healthcare providers for
the same episode. In such cases, we set the first pro-
vider visited as the explained variable.
If alternative-specific variables (i.e., pecuniary costs
and time costs) alone have a random component,
utility for the choice of alternative j by respondent i
is given as
Uij ¼ x0ijβi þ z
0




iγ j þ x
0
ijvi þ εij; ð1Þ
where xij is a vector of alternative-specific variables. zi
is a vector of respondent-specific variables. εij is the
error term, which mixed logit models assume follows
an extreme value distribution. In Eq. (1), βi = β + vi,
where vi denotes random coefficients. The logit prob-
ability of alternative j selected by respondent i is rep-
resented as
Pij j vi ¼
1 jð Þ  exp x0ijβþ z
0
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where 1(j) takes a value of 1 if a respondent knows cost-
related information of alternative j and 0 otherwise.
Probability of choice is the integral of the logit probabil-
ity over density function vi. Assuming f(v) is a probability
density function of vi with a normal distribution, theprobability of choosing alternative j selected by respond-
ent i is described as
Pij ¼












f vð Þdv; j ¼ 1;…; J :
ð3Þ
We used Stata15 (StataCorp, Texas, USA) and the
command asmixlogit. Simulation methods with 500 Hal-
ton draws approximate the maximum log likelihood.
Individual-specific variables were the minor child’s
gender, age, perceived severity of illness, caregiver’s
education, presence of Western drugs in the house-
hold, household size (number of persons), and an
index of household assets. Assets were selected to
proxy long-term wealth by constructing a linear index
of asset ownership and housing characteristics using
principle component analysis [22]. Seven dummies
estimate the index: owning a mobile phone, owning a
radio or stereo, living a house with tin roof, living a
house with a Western-style wall, owning a generator,
having safe drinking water, and owning a car or out-
board motorboat [16].
Results
Awareness of healthcare services and formation of choice
sets
Our results reveal that almost all (98%) of caregivers had
the information on the location of Dagua Health Center
and VHVs, while 65% of them on the locations of public
clinics in Wewak, 56% of them on traditional health
practitioners, 54% of them on aid posts, and 12% of
them on the dispenser of Western pharmaceuticals
(Table 1). Caregivers indicated that 493 of the 2679 mi-
nors (or 18% of minors) living in the surveyed house-
holds had episodes of fever during the survey period.
Treating the febrile minor at home was the most com-
mon choice (40%), followed by visiting VHVs (34%), the
health center (13%), and the aid posts (9%). These four
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choices. Other healthcare providers included traditional
practitioners (1.8%, or 9 responses), outreach by health
center staff (0.6%, or 3 responses), public clinics in
Wewak (0.4%, or 2 responses), dispensers of Western
drugs (0.4%, or 2 responses), and unknown (0.4%, or 2
responses). No visits to Wewak General Hospital were
reported. As noted above, we excluded alternatives with
probabilities below 2% from the individual choice sets.
Consequently, the choice of the four alternatives, namely,
home-treatment, VHVs, the health center, and the aid
posts remained for analysis as our explained variable.Adjustment of time costs
Self-reported travel time correlated to the measured dis-
tance traveled (correlation coefficient: 0.755 for health
center; 0.422 for aid post; 0.354 for VHV), but self-
reported time varied widely among respondents with iden-
tical travel distances, reflecting differences in respondents’
life-styles and faulty recollections. Large measurement er-
rors in variables create unreliable coefficients in empirical
models, and the effect of travel time on choice of treat-
ment provider can be underestimated [23].
Therefore, we used ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion to adjust self-reported round-trip time on walking
distance, transportation distance, and wait/examination
time as explanatory variables (Table 2). The coefficient of
wait/treatment time, however, was not significant in the
regression of the health center care time and was excluded
from the explanatory variables in the correction regression
for the health center. As to the regression of VHVs care
time, explanatory variables were walking distance and
wait/treatment time; there was no one who used public
transportation to visit them. The estimates of these three
regressions should give us more objective value of time
spent for the trip to each healthcare provider.Table 2 OLS estimation of travel time spent on each healthcare
visit
Health center Aid post VHV
Walking distance (km) 0.198*** 0.290*** 0.254***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.024)
Transportation distance (km) 0.133*** 0.115***
(0.003) (0.009)
wait/treatment time (h) 0.605*** 1.385***
(0.101) (0.063)
constant 3.686*** 2.808*** 0.363***
(0.149) (0.214) (0.063)
N 1006 502 1026
R-squared 0.639 0.388 0.407
VHV village health volunteer
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1Almost all caregivers (99%) were females (i. e., mothers,
grandmothers or female relatives in a household). Among
females, almost all (> 99%) were non-wage workers and
spent time for domestic work and farming. Therefore, dif-
ference of wage rate seemed little among the caregivers.
As we did not get the information on wage rate of domes-
tic work or agricultural work in PNG, we adopted formal
minimum wage rate for estimating wage rate of study
caregivers. Using these adjusted time spent for taking their
children to the healthcare providers, we calculated time
costs of the visits by multiplying them by the hourly mini-
mum wage in Papua New Guinea Kina (PGK 3.2/h, PGK
1 =USD 0.38) [24].
Descriptive statistics of variables
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of treatment fees and
transportation costs for healthcare outside the household
in their explanatory variables. On average, both costs
were the highest for Dagua Health Center. Moreover,
the caregivers who chose the health center, paid more
for transportation than for treatment, but, the caregivers
who chose the aid posts, the treatment fees exceeded the
transportation costs. Presumably, many caregivers, seek-
ing for the best available care, took public transporta-
tions to the health center, but few did so to the aid
posts. In contrast, all caregivers visited VHVs on foot,
incurring no transportation cost.
As travel time using public transit is the longest to the
health center for most caregivers, the average time costs
are the highest for the health center, followed by the aid
posts and then by the VHVs.
Also wait/treatment time was the longest at the health
center. At the center, practitioners work 24 h in shifts
and absenteeism is not a problem; lengthy waits were
observed in the morning with the simultaneous arrival
of new patients by the public transportation services. For
the aid posts or for VHVs, however, our observation
suggested that it was not the concentration of patients
that caused lengthy waits. Within the survey area, a sin-
gle health worker was assigned as a VHV or to each aid
post, and many worked in their homes as farmers.
Lengthy waits occurred when they had not reported for
work, primarily because they were farming in their dis-
tant fields, and caregivers had to wait their return.
Time costs evaluated at minimum wage exceed pecuniary
costs for all providers because public transportation and
treatment fees at formal facilities are relatively inexpensive,
but it takes substantial time to reach them in rural PNG.
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for individual, care-
givers, and household characteristics with respect to our
explanatory variables. Average years of schooling for care-
givers is 6.2 years, reflecting completion of 6 year primary
school for most caregivers. Households on average have
6.7 members, and 37% keep Western pharmaceuticals
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of cost-related information for
health services
Cost, distance, and time N mean SD min max
Pecuniary costs (PGK)
Health center 455 8.48 4.73 0 23
Aid post 243 2.18 2.82 0 15
VHV 446 0.33 0.60 0 2
Treatment fee (PGK)
Health center 462 2.76 1.31 0 10
Aid post 247 1.39 0.96 0 5
VHV 446 0.33 0.60 0 2
Transportation costs (PGK)
Health center 455 5.73 4.51 0 20
Aid post 248 0.76 2.24 0 12
VHV 463 0 0 0 0
Time costs (PGK)
Health center 457 26.30 7.43 12.29 39.12
Aid post 225 19.45 5.65 9.13 37.23
VHV 428 5.17 2.85 1.65 17.65
Walking distance (km)
Health center 457 5.71 4.99 0.78 23.42
Aid post 236 7.78 5.65 0.06 23.49
VHV 475 2.03 1.77 0.00 8.33
Transportation distance (km)
Health center 457 25.53 20.02 0.00 58.23
Aid post 236 3.79 11.55 0.00 61.23
VHV 428 0 0 0 0
Wait/treatment time (hour)
Health center 434 1.36 1.04 0.00 8.00
Aid post 238 0.98 0.96 0.00 6.00
VHV 428 0.53 0.62 0.00 4.47
PGK Papua New Guinea Kina, VHV village health volunteer
PGK 1 = USD 0.38 (https://www.bankpng.gov.pg/historical-exchange-rates/)
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of child, caregiver, and household
characteristics








Age (year) 475 6.023 4.056 0 14
Caregiver





Asset index 467 0.000 1.309 −1.182 7.117
Total number of members 472 6.689 2.684 2 19
aPercentage is in parentheses
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6.5%). These drugs, generally unavailable in rural areas,
presumably had been prescribed at formal health facilities
or VHVs on earlier visits.
Results show that 89% of households own mobile
phones, 46% have access to safe drinking water, 41% own
radios, 14% have metal or concrete roofs, 13% have gener-
ators, 6.4% have brick or metal walls, and 4.0% own a ve-
hicle or outboard motorboat. The median and mode for
the number of assets is 2, the average is 2.1, and 88% of
households own three or fewer of the assets surveyed.
Mixed logit model estimation
We employed a mixed logit model with home-treatment
as the base alternative to estimate the choice probability
among 439 observations (excluding 36 with missingvalues). We estimated four models; in Model 1, alterna-
tive-specific explanatory variables consist of only the pecu-
niary costs, in Model 2, they consist of only the time costs,
in Model 3, they consist of the pecuniary costs and time
costs, and in Model 4, they consist of only the total costs,
or the sums of the pecuniary costs and the time costs. The
coefficient of any cost in any model is significantly nega-
tive (Table 5). The random component of the pecuniary
costs is 0.181 and it is statistically significant, but the ran-
dom component of time costs is statistically insignificant,
in other words, the effects of the pecuniary costs on pro-
vider choice vary substantially among caregivers, but the
effects of time costs do not.
Comparison of log likelihood, Akaike information cri-
teria, and pseudo-R2 statistics of the four models reveals
Model 3 is the best specification of the four. Conse-
quently, we have adopted Model 3 as the basis of our
counterfactual analysis regarding the pecuniary costs of
a health provider without changing values of the other
explanatory variables. The mean choice probability for
each type of provider, given a hypothetical change in its
pecuniary costs, is its average predicted choice probabil-
ity. The mean choice probability curve for the alternative
is downwardly convex and barely changes when the
costs exceed PGK 10 (Fig. 1a–c).
With respect to the changes in own pecuniary costs,
the choice probability of a VHV is the most own-price
elastic, followed by Dagua Health Center and the aid
posts. When the pecuniary costs of VHVs are set to 0,
its choice probability is 0.34 and ranks second after
Table 5 Mixed logit model estimation
Model 1 Model 2
Health center Aid post VHV Health center Aid post VHV
Pecuniary costs −0.269*** −0.269*** −0.269***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Time costs − 0.105*** − 0.105*** − 0.105***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Total cost
Illness severity 1.205*** 0.775* 0.815*** 1.224*** 0.840** 0.875***
(0.352) (0.415) (0.240) (0.331) (0.416) (0.243)
Age −0.037 −0.057 0.022 − 0.063 − 0.067 0.033
(0.043) (0.054) (0.029) (0.040) (0.054) (0.029)
Male 0.301 −0.593 −0.700*** 0.177 −0.531 −0.759***
(0.351) (0.397) (0.235) (0.321) (0.395) (0.237)
Caregiver’s education −0.026 0.107 0.035 −0.033 0.125* 0.052
(0.064) (0.075) (0.042) (0.059) (0.075) (0.042)
Western medicine 0.064 −0.699 0.032 0.019 −0.742* −0.020
(0.354) (0.427) (0.239) (0.320) (0.424) (0.240)
Asset index 0.240* −0.223 −0.049 0.187 −0.199 −0.066
(0.141) (0.195) (0.087) (0.118) (0.203) (0.088)
Household size −0.076 − 0.188** −0.012 −0.086 −0.169* 0.000
(0.069) (0.091) (0.045) (0.061) (0.091) (0.046)
Constant 0.354 0.559 −0.465 1.802** 1.801* −0.261
(0.812) (0.936) (0.519) (0.858) (0.986) (0.535)
Random component
Pecuniary costs 0.150 0.150 0.150
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061)




Log likelihood − 451.463 − 446.677
AIC 954.926 945.355
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.091
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Table 5 Mixed logit model estimation (Continued)
Model 3 Model 4
Health center Aid post VHV Health center Aid post VHV
Pecuniary costs −0.207** −0.207** −0.207**
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Time costs −0.091*** −0.091*** −0.091***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Total cost −0.097*** −0.097*** −0.097***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Illness severity 1.375*** 0.837** 0.845*** 1.338*** 0.851** 0.880***
(0.372) (0.423) (0.242) (0.370) (0.430) (0.244)
Age 0.242 −0.580 −0.755*** 0.245 −0.596 −0.753***
(0.367) (0.404) (0.238) (0.356) (0.408) (0.239)
Male −0.050 −0.076 0.031 − 0.061 −0.066 0.031
(0.045) (0.056) (0.029) (0.043) (0.056) (0.029)
Caregiver’s education −0.057 0.130* 0.046 −0.037 0.123 0.049
(0.068) (0.078) (0.042) (0.066) (0.078) (0.042)
Western medicine 0.075 −0.818* −0.033 0.023 −0.754* −0.027
(0.369) (0.436) (0.242) (0.355) (0.438) (0.243)
Asset index 0.262* −0.240 − 0.058 0.247* −0.207 −0.063
(0.149) (0.206) (0.087) (0.139) (0.206) (0.088)
Household size − 0.078 −0.176* −0.001 −0.087 −0.179* −0.002
(0.072) (0.092) (0.046) (0.068) (0.093) (0.047)
Constant 2.132** 1.984* −0.190 1.926** 1.890* −0.206
(0.966) (1.025) (0.532) (0.934) (1.052) (0.542)
Random component
Pecuniary costs 0.181 0.181 0.181
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Time costs 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Total cost 0.033 0.033 0.033
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
N 439 439
Log likelihood − 442.545 − 444.710
AIC 941.089 941.421
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.095
VHV village health volunteer
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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not increase substantially even if pecuniary costs of the
health center or the aid posts are set to zero, and the
order of magnitude of their choice probability would re-
main unchanged. An increase in pecuniary costs for
Dagua Health Center would slightly increase the choice
probability of home-treatment or VHV’s, but contrary to
what one might think, it would have almost no effect on
the choice of the aid-posts. An increase in pecuniarycosts of the aid posts exhibit similar tendencies, but the
magnitude of the changes are far smaller than Health
Center’s increase. An increase in pecuniary costs of
VHVs would have little effect on the other two choices.
With respect to the changes in own time costs, the
mean choice probability curves are close to straight lines
sloping downward (Fig. 1d–f). Choice probabilities appear
to be more responsive to the changes in own time costs
than the changes in own pecuniary costs, comparing the
Fig. 1 The choice probabilities of the four alternatives for a change in the pecuniary cost of the health center, aid post, or village health
volunteer (left: 1a, 1b, and 1c) and the choice probabilities of the four alternatives for a change in the time cost of the health center, aid post, or
village health volunteer (right: 1d, 1e, and 1f). The dashed line indicates each average cost. The unit of cost is in Papua New Guinea Kina (Kina
1 = USD 0.38). VHV: village health volunteer
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probability of choosing each alternative at zero time costs
exceeds that of zero pecuniary costs (0.42 vs 0.24 for
Dagua Health Center, 0.25 vs 0.11 for aid posts, 0.44 vs
0.34 for VHVs). Regarding the cross-effects of time costs,
for Dagua Health Center, VHVs and home-treatment are
its clear substitutes, and, for the aid posts, the other three
seem to be weak substitutes. On the other hand, an in-
crease in time costs of VHVs would strongly increase the
choice of home-treatment, but it would only mildly in-
crease the choices of Health Center and the aid posts.
Among individual-specific variables, severity of illness
increases the probability of choice for each type of health-
care providers over the home-treatment (Table 5). There-
fore, we performed a sub-group analysis for severity.
Given mild symptoms, pecuniary costs exerted relatively
little effects on the probability of choosing the providers,
but, for children with severe symptoms, they were much
more significant (Table 6). For example, when thepecuniary costs are set to zero, caregivers of children with
mild symptoms would not much increase the choice of
healthcare services (Fig. 2a–c), but more caregivers of chil-
dren with severe symptoms would choose either the
health center or VHVs than home-treatment (Fig. 2d–f).
Irrespective of severity of symptoms, increases in time
costs significantly reduce the probability of choosing all
providers (Table 6). For children with severe symptoms
(Fig. 3d–f), however, the choice probability diminishes
more slowly than for children with mild symptoms as
time costs increases (Fig. 3a–c).
The probability of choosing VHVs is significantly
higher when the patient child is female. At 10% signifi-
cance, holding of Western medicine, a higher-educated
caregiver, and small household size increase the prob-
ability of choosing an aid post. Larger assets raised the
probability of choosing a health center (Table 5). In sub-
group analysis, these effects are significant only for se-
vere symptoms (Table 6).
Table 6 Illness severity sub-group analysis
Mild sub-group Severe sub-group
Health center Aid post VHV Health center Aid post VHV
Pecuniary costs − 0.125 −0.125 −0.125 −0.303** −0.303** −0.303**
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145)
Time costs −0.122*** −0.122*** −0.122*** −0.086*** −0.086*** −0.086***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Age −0.058 0.039 −0.008 −0.030 −0.177** 0.066
(0.064) (0.086) (0.043) (0.072) (0.085) (0.042)
Male 0.041 −0.906 −0.665* 0.516 −0.596 −0.851**
(0.535) (0.656) (0.356) (0.574) (0.569) (0.332)
Caregiver’s education 0.120 0.178 0.075 −0.158 0.079 0.023
(0.117) (0.142) (0.067) (0.099) (0.106) (0.055)
Western medicine −0.070 −0.387 −0.010 0.082 −1.216** −0.056
(0.549) (0.705) (0.364) (0.561) (0.599) (0.337)
Asset index 0.310 0.065 −0.102 0.308 −0.549* −0.062
(0.211) (0.260) (0.172) (0.246) (0.319) (0.106)
Household size 0.039 −0.175 −0.014 −0.159 −0.163 0.003
(0.110) (0.163) (0.083) (0.108) (0.117) (0.057)
Constant 0.707 1.509 −0.003 4.443*** 3.662*** 0.609
(1.561) (1.664) (0.806) (1.418) (1.398) (0.677)
Random component
Pecuniary 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.273 0.273 0.273
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
Time costs 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
N 198 241
Log likelihood −182.946 − 250.154
AIC 415.892 548.308
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.110
VHV village health volunteer
In the severe sub-group, a random component for time costs was not included because the model did not converge when random components were assumed
for both pecuniary and time costs
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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In selecting healthcare providers for febrile children, we
have found that their caregivers respond more to changes
in the time costs than changes in the pecuniary costs.
Counterfactual analysis reveals that the probability of
choosing a provider with zero time costs is higher than
choosing an identical one with zero pecuniary costs. There-
fore, reducing time costs rather than pecuniary costs should
be more effective in promoting the use of health services.
Furthermore, according to our mixed logit estimation re-
sults, policies targeting to reduce time costs likely have
higher internal validity than policies targeting to reduce pe-
cuniary costs. This is because the effects of time costs on
provider choice are similar among caregivers, while the ef-
fects of pecuniary costs among caregivers can varysubstantially among caregivers due to their prominent indi-
vidual heterogeneity. These findings commend a policy of
reducing the time costs of health services.
From the view-point of VHVs time costs, home-
treatment is far-closer substitute than the other two health-
care facilities. Reducing the time costs of VHVs would have
minor negative impacts on the choice of these facilities, but
would induce a substantial behavioral change from home-
treatment to VHVs. Reducing the time costs of VHVs
should raise total demand for health services. In many
cases, patients are kept waiting because VHVs are farming
in their own fields instead of waiting for patients who may
come. Unsalaried VHVs have little incentive to serve the
residents of their community, but paying them at least the
minimum wage may provide them the incentive.
Fig. 2 The choice probabilities of the four alternatives for a change in the pecuniary cost of the health center, aid post, or village health
volunteer in the mild symptom sub-group (left: 2a, 2b, and 2c) and the choice probabilities of the four alternatives for a change in the pecuniary
cost of the health center, aid post, or village health volunteer in the severe symptom sub-group (right: 2d, 2e, and 2f). The dashed line indicates
each average cost. The unit of cost is in Papua New Guinea Kina (Kina 1 = USD 0.38). VHV: village health volunteer
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may include appropriate geographical relocation, in-
creased public transportation, and road maintenance. Ex-
penses of these policies could be prohibitive in LMIC.
Even for them, however, policies to reduce wait times at
these facilities can be implemented at small costs. Ap-
pointments by email, short-message services, and websites
improve access and reduce wait times [25, 26]. Even in
LMIC, a stated preference study endorses a short-message
service-based appointment system [27]. Given that about
90% of residents in our surveyed area own mobile phones,
health facilities may be able to reduce wait times by sched-
uling appointments using inexpensive text messaging.
In addition, rates of follow-up visits likely can be in-
creased by using the reservation system at each health
facility and better outcome can be expected. Exchanging
information by text message may establish intra-system
cooperation, such as referrals from VHVs to aid postsand health centers and reverse referrals from health cen-
ters to VHVs and aid posts [28].
Wait times at Dagua Health Center rose because of
patient congestion in the morning and waiting for public
transportation to return home. Introducing the sched-
uled appointment system described above could reduce
the former. Reducing time of patients awaiting public
transport may be possible by using one of the two am-
bulances at Dagua Health Center. Cost effectiveness ana-
lysis could clarify the added expenses of this policy.
Aid post workers also are sometimes absent during
working hours. They receive fixed salaries regardless of
patient load, but docking their salaries for absences may
not be easy. The more important issue is that in remote
communities, they are not substitutes for the health cen-
ter, because many potential patients are unaware of
them. Further studies are needed to investigate whether
such unawareness is attributable to supply-side factors
Fig. 3 The choice probabilities of the four alternatives for a change in the time cost of the health center, aid post, or village health volunteer in
the mild symptom sub-group (left: 3a, 3b, and 3c) and the choice probabilities of the four alternatives for a change in the time cost of the health
center, aid post, or village health volunteer in the severe symptom sub-group (right: 3d, 3e, and 3f). The dashed line indicates each average cost.
The unit of cost is in Papua New Guinea Kina (Kina 1 = USD 0.38). VHV: village health volunteer
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demand-side factors such as community characteristics.
Selecting and qualifying skilled VHVs as aid post workers
after completing training may strengthen the function of the
aid posts. Although that entails substantial expenditure for
training, construction, and operation of facilities, health
workers accepted by their villages should have high retention
rates and become key providers of rural healthcare. Oppor-
tunity for promotion could motivate current VHVs.
Although pecuniary costs of health services is less elastic
than time costs, raising treatment fees, especially for
VHVs, should not be easily carried out. Demand for their
services in the area studied is not excessive, even when
treatment is free. If pecuniary costs for services were
nearly zero, small out-of-pocket payments could reduce
the probability of choosing their provider, although pa-
tients who need treatment might go elsewhere.
The probability of choosing a healthcare provider is more
elastic with respect to changes in pecuniary costs. Overall,severity of symptoms little affects it with regard to time
costs, but the response to pecuniary costs is heterogeneous
among caregivers: some visited a provider regardless of pe-
cuniary costs, whereas others reacted strongly to changes in
pecuniary costs. That was more prominent with severe
symptoms. Therefore, it is necessary for the severely ill not
to avoid health-service visits.
This study has several limitations. First, recall bias may
have occurred because our questionnaire asks caregivers
to recall events of the two previous weeks. The actual
occurrence of fevers may have been higher and visits to
healthcare providers fewer because caregivers did not re-
call minor symptoms or regarded illnesses as asymptom-
atic. Second, our model did not measure VHVs’ clinical
skills, potentially a factor affecting patients’ choice of
healthcare provider. Its exclusion might foster estimation
bias. Third, we studied only one administrative area of
PNG. Studies elsewhere are needed to provide external
validity.
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Using a mixed logit model, we investigated how pecuni-
ary costs or time costs of healthcare providers affect
caregiver’s choice of treatment for his/her febrile child
in rural PNG. Further, we altered pecuniary costs and
time costs for each healthcare provider to compare
probability of choosing a type of healthcare provider
counterfactually. The features of our model are that we
included pecuniary costs (including transportation cost)
and time costs as explanatory variables, and we esti-
mated our model using stated cost information, resulting
in that a treatment choice set with individual heterogen-
eity (the probability of choosing unrecognized health
services was set to 0). Compared to reducing pecuniary
costs, reducing time costs significantly affected the prob-
ability that caregivers would choose treatment by VHVs,
an aid post, or a health center. We also observed individ-
ual heterogeneity in effects of pecuniary costs on choice
of healthcare provider. Although IMIC have restricted
health and financial resources, they need to develop pol-
icies to reduce time costs and pecuniary costs to im-
prove access to essential healthcare.
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